WEB APPENDICES
Price scenarios across product categories were randomly allocated to different versions of the paper and pen questionnaire to avoid order and position effects. We matched these different versions between the placebo and the treatment groups to make both conditions comparable. Figure A1 illustrates the design principles underlying the price scenarios used in all the studies. In each price scenario, the price of the compromise option M-which serves as the target option for our manipulation of the choice sets-was between the L and H prices. For each product category, we increased the trade-off difficulty between L and M from scenario 1 to scenario 5 by successively increasing the price for L and decreasing the price for M. This was done in the binary sets as well as the trinary sets. The prices for option H in the trinary sets were always higher than for L and M, but were not varied according to a clear trend (see Table A1 ). To measure their risk attitude in the financial domain, subjects participated in a lottery choice task where they were shown a series of lottery pairs (Holt and Laury 2002) . Subjects had to choose between a less risky lottery A (with a small payoff variance but a low initial expected value) and a risky lottery B (with a greater payoff variance but a high initial expected value).
The lottery pairs included a systematic trade-off between the two lottery types, as the expected payoff of the less risky lottery A increased, whereas the expected payoff of the risky lottery B decreased from early to later decisions (Table A2) . Accordingly, the subjects started by choosing lottery B (risky) based on the much higher initial expected value (189 points compared to 49 points for lottery A) in their first decisions and switched to the (less risky) A lottery in the later decisions when the expected value of lottery A approached that of lottery B (Holt and Laury 2002) . The point where a subject switched from the risky lottery B to the less risky lottery A is a measure of his risk attitude: a risk-neutral individual is expected to solely base his decision on the expected payoffs of the two lotteries and is therefore assumed to switch from B to A exactly when the expected value of lottery A exceeds the expected value of lottery B. In contrast, a risk-averse decision maker is expected to switch earlier due to the smaller variance in the decision outcomes inherent in the A lotteries. The later a participant switches from the risky lottery B to the less risky lottery A, the less risk-averse this participant is. Incentive compatibility of the procedure was ensured by randomly drawing one of the participant's lottery decisions to become payoff relevant. We tested whether ATD affected subjects' mood, which, in turn, could have an effect on their buying behavior (Gardner 1985; Strack, Werth', and Deutsch 2006 constructs (Fornell and Larcker 1981) . Next, we compared the MDMQ scores within the subjects (pre-versus post-treatment exposure) and between the two groups. To test for differences, we established mixed-effect general linear models, using a separate model for each of the three MDMQ dimensions.
We defined the pleasantness scores of the pre-and post-exposure as a within-subjects factor and the experimental condition (treatment vs. placebo) as a between-subjects factor.
We built analogous models for the wakefulness and calmness dimensions. The results revealed no significant differences between the treatment and placebo groups (pleasantness: (45) = -0.42; p = 0.674). Congruently, we found no significant differences in financial risk taking (Mann-Whitney-U = 247.5; p = 0.539). The median switching point from the more risky lottery B to the less risky lottery A was earlier than expected for risk-neutral individuals in both groups, indicating risk-averse subjects (Web Appendix II). In sum, ATD did not have an influence on subjects' mood or risk attitude / risk taking behavior.
The pre-analysis in study 2 was analogous to that in study 1. 
ADDITIONAL ANALYSES (STUDIES 1 -4)

Analysis of Choice Deferral
To account for the multiple observations per respondent with regard to our hypothesis about choice deferral in studies 1-3, we estimated mixed-effect logit models using a dependent binary decision variable (1=buy, 0=no buy). The models accounted for the data's nested multilevel structure by including a respondent-specific random intercept together with a nested product group-specific random effect intercept. The independent fixed effect predictor was coded 1 if a subject belongs to the placebo group and 0 if belonging to the treatment group. In accordance with our directional hypothesis, we expected the treatment's coefficient to be positive and significant, indicating that the subjects in the placebo group are less likely to defer product decisions. Our analyses show that this holds for study 1 results (ß = 2.57, one-sided p = 0.040), for study 2 results (ß=1.12, one-sided p<0.001), as well as study 3 results (ß=2.15, one-sided p=0.044).
Analysis of the Compromise Effect
For the within-subjects designs (studies 1 and 4a) we conducted a further robustness check to account for multiple decisions per respondent. We averaged all the switching patterns of each respondent, giving us the relative frequencies of a participant's switches from L to M after adding H. This measure of the within-subjects compromise effect ranges from 0 (if a participant did not switch at all) to 1 (if switching was observed in all decision instances). Next, we evaluated if the mean tendency to switch from L to M is significantly different from zero. Our analysis of study 1 data reveals that this is the case for the placebo group (mean difference = 0.017 (SD = 0.043), t(23) = 1.881; p = 0.037), but not for the treatment group (mean difference = 0.000, (SD = 0.000) t(22) = 0; p = 1.000). The difference between both experimental groups is also significant (t(23-Welch) = -1.881; p = 0.037). Our analogous, analysis of study 4a reveals that the mean tendency to switch from L to M is significantly different from zero for the placebo group (mean difference = 0.064 (SD = 0.080), t(23) = 3.922; p = 0.001) and also for the treatment group (mean difference = 0.024, (SD = 0.047) t(24) = 2.571; p = 0.017). Consistent with our hypotheses, the within-subjects compromise effect is significantly more pronounced in the placebo group compared to the treatment group (t(47) = 2.146; p = 0.037).
As a further robustness check of studies 2 and 4b results, we used a similar approach as for studies 1 and 4a, but accounted for the fact that it was not possible to aggregate switches in a between-subjects design setting. Therefore, we averaged the M and L decisions of every respondent, which yielded the respondent-specific rates for choosing L and M. Next, we computed a respondent-specific index for the attractiveness of M over L by subtracting the L options' rate from the M options' rate. This measure is negative if a respondent-on average-prefers L to M, and positive if M is more often preferred to L. In accordance with our hypotheses, we found that option M was significantly more attractive in the trinary sets than in the binary sets in the placebo group in study 2 (MeanTrinary = 0.36 (0.31) vs. MeanBinary 
Analysis of Order Effects.
We also tested for order effects in subjects' decisions from the earlier to the later price scenarios as described in Web Appendix I. For this purpose, we analyzed the development of the choice shares of the compromise option M as well as the no-buy option. As expected, we observe higher choice shares for the target option M in later scenarios as M becomes cheaper over time. This trend applies to both, binary and trinary sets and, therefore, does not cofound the results interpretation. Beyond this trend, our analyses did not indicate any systematic effects across the different price scenarios and studies regarding subjects' choices of the compromise option or the no-buy option. Likewise, we found no interaction of potential order effects with the ATD treatment.
